Beijing is reportedly targeting Canadian political aides in an attempt to covertly influence their superiors by controlling event schedules, shaping talking points, and managing requests from community groups. Newly released documents reveal that these staffers hold significant power as “gatekeepers” for their employers, allowing them to clandestinely control and influence the activities of elected and appointed officials in ways that align with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) interests.
The potential for staffers to sway officials manifests in various ways. They can prevent certain community groups’ requests from being seen, frame talking points to align with Beijing’s narratives, or organize public events at locations favorable to Chinese interests. For example, they may choose venues owned by a Chinese proxy or culturally significant sites like city halls or legislative buildings.
It is important to note that political aides do not necessarily need to openly support China in order to become targets. The CCP also seeks to co-opt those who do not openly oppose or speak out against China or the Party. These aides are then persuaded to adopt positions friendly towards Beijing and speak out against actions perceived as “anti-China,” such as raising human rights concerns or visiting Taiwan officially.
According to a briefing from Canada’s intelligence agency CSIS on March 25th, local community networks play a crucial role in facilitating foreign interference activities. Chinese officials often conduct these activities through local networks tied but not directly controlled by PRC officials.
The foreign influence networks led by Beijing include staff of targeted candidates and elected officials, Chinese officials residing in Canada, leaders of local Chinese-Canadian community groups, as well as Canadian political candidates and officials themselves. This network structure allows for an adaptable approach that extends and enables covert PRC influence at all levels of government.
Prior to the 2019 election, intelligence reports indicated that 11 federal candidates and at least 13 aides were either implicated in or impacted by China-linked threat actors operating within Canada. Some individuals appeared willing to cooperate with foreign interference-related activity while others seemed unaware due its secretive nature.
In one example cited in the summary report, PRC officials met with political staffers and explicitly conveyed their expectation for these staffers’ involvement in screening their candidate’s attendance at certain events hosted by Taiwanese officials. Political staffers are considered important points of contact because they play a role in the information flow process towards elected officials while also influencing which events a candidate attends.
